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Under what conditions is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
(UNHCR) able to successfully repatriate and reintegrate refugees to their country of 
origin?  This work aims to evaluate the success of UNHCR’s initiative to sponsor the  
repatriation and reintegration of political refugees who voluntarily chose to return to their 
homeland.  The study of political refugees is essential in International Relations, since it  
entails the failure of preventing ethnic violence and civil unrest.  Overall, the emergence 
of refugees is the product of the inability of conflict prevention.  Voluntary repatriation 
and reintegration of these refugees provides a message of mending relations, state re-
building and hope.  Successful repatriation is the return of refugees with the expectation 
of a safe return to society.  Successful reintegration however ensures their inclusion in 
society.  Therefore, both terms may be related, but must be discussed separately.  This 
inclusion is essential to reconciliation, and the formation of a peaceful, stable society.  
Hence, this research will bring a better understanding of victims of conflict, the inability 
of the state to protect its citizens, and possible patterns of repatriation, reintegration and 
conflict resolution.      To answer the question of the success of UNHCR’s policies of 
repatriation and reintegration, I will use two cross-regional case studies: Guatemala and 
Afghanistan.  I will address the hardship undergone by political refugees, the policies 
they have encountered from UNHCR, and the scenario of voluntary repatriation patterns.  
I will then evaluate the conditions on the ground to which refugees are returning.  
Clearly, if these have a high violence rate, a sustainable life and successful reintegration 
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The study of political refugees is essential in International Relations.  It entails the 
failure of preventing ethnic violence and civil unrest, since the emergence of refugees is 
the product of the inability of conflict prevention.  This work aims to evaluate the success 
of UNHCR’s initiative to sponsor the repatriation and reintegration of political refugees 
who voluntarily chose to return to their homeland in two cases: Guatemala and 
Afghanistan, and why have the results differed so much.  Hence, the following question 
arises: Under what conditions and strategies is the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) able to successfully repatriate and reintegrate refugees to their 
country of origin?  This question arises from the similarity of refugee situation in both 
situations and how repatriation efforts veered into different plans of action that despite 
having the same purpose had very diverse results.  Hence, this thesis will evaluate which 
repatriation tactic is more effective and why. 
 
Significance of This Topic 
 
In the year 2003 alone the number of Refugees and Asylum Seekers was of 
11,900,000 people.1 This does not account for the internally displaced population 
(IDP’s). Clearly this Diaspora is a product of internal conflict and often of state-led 
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violence that has scaled to a fatal extent. As a result refugees migrate to seek their 
survival, often to foreign lands.  Here they not only constitute a humanitarian issue, but 
an economic one as well.  International Organizations and host countries incur in 
expenditures when providing shelter, food, medical attention and at times educational 
programs for refugees.     
 The international community’s failure to avoid these conflicts has led to the 
intervention after the conflict has erupted in a massive scale.  This displacement is a 
result of humans’ worst actions: Ethnic cleansing, genocide or any form of persecution 
that threatens human life.2  Refugees, therefore represent the fear, misery and suffering 
that most of us fail to see when we study violence.  
Another aspect of refugees that is often overlooked is that movement of people is 
part of a globalization pattern.  As the world becomes more interdependent, we will see 
how the emergence of refugees affects us all.   Refugees may indirectly become key 
players in domestic issues to the host country, since refugee camps have proven to 
become an economic burden for it.3  A consequence of the perception of refugees having 
a negative impact in a host county has been disparity in Asylum policies and ethnic 
discrimination, as we will see in the case of Afghans in Pakistan.  Another impact is the 
acquiring of a heterogeneous society.  For instance, Afghan refugees in Pakistan were 
known to have economic and environmental impact in Pakistan, and there was a fear that 
the longer they remained in Pakistan, they would likely become or form an influential 
political force.4  A local example has been the impact of the influx of Cuban refugees in 
South Florida and their role in urban development and to the representation of Latin 
participation in politics.5 Like any Diaspora, refugees will change the face of the society 
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they chose to migrate to.  Some examples of refugees that have had key impact in their 
country of asylum have been James Joban (the Architect of the White House), Albert 
Einstein, Frederic Chopin, Isabel Allende or Clara Zetkin (Female activist and founder of 
International Women’s Day).6 
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration of these refugees provides a message of 
mending relations, state re-building and hope.  Successful repatriation is the return of 
refugees with the expectation of a safe return to society.  Successful reintegration 
however ensures their inclusion in society.  Therefore, both terms may be related, but 
must be discussed separately.  This inclusion is essential to reconciliation, and the 
formation of a peaceful, stable society.  Hence, this research brings a better understanding 
of victims of conflict, the inability of the state to protect its citizens, and possible patterns 
of repatriation, reintegration and conflict resolution.  Perhaps the most influential lesson 
in this thesis will be the analysis of the true consequences in reintegration.  By 
questioning the method employed at each reintegration case, we will find out why 





According to the UN 1951 Convention on the status of refugees, they are defined 
as individuals who have fled their country of origin with a well founded fear of 
persecution due to political opinion, ethnicity, religion or social group they belong to and 
are therefore unable (or unwilling) to return to their country.7  The UNHCR Handbook on 
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Repatriation also defines repatriation as the returning to a country of origin with the 
assumption of conflict resolution and the end of refugees’ “well founded fear of 
persecution”. 
Political refugees are clearly a product of ethnic violence, war or state-led 
violence.  When attempts of conflict resolution fail to prevent this violence, the rational 
human action will be to seek survival.  A wave of forced migration emerges as a 
consequence of the lack of conflict prevention and/or resolution.  When confronted with a 
significant amount of refugees, UNHCR sees itself with three possible solutions: (1) 
Voluntary repatriation and reintegration, (2) Integration into host country and (3) 
Resettlement to a third country.  The last two solutions are often employed when conflict 
resolution in the country of origin has not yet been achieved.  For the scope of this thesis 
however, I limit the research to voluntary repatriation organized and funded by 
UNHCR’s long-term repatriation and reintegration programs. The purpose for this focus 
is to evaluate the effectiveness of UNHCR-funded programs.  To achieve this, there must 
be a clear distinction between repatriation and reintegration.  As I had mentioned earlier, 
repatriation simply involves movement.  Reintegration on the other hand, implies greater 
equality, successful mending of differences and a sustainable livelihood for returnees.  
Hence, reintegration is defined as the inclusion of returnees into the protection of the 
state’s legal system, equal protection and equal access to public goods, such as access to 
heath, education, food and political involvement.8 
To answer the question of the success of UNHCR’s policies of repatriation and 
reintegration, I have used two cross-regional case studies: Guatemala and Afghanistan.  I 
have addressed the hardship undergone by political refugees, the policies they have 
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encountered from UNHCR, and the scenario of voluntary repatriation patterns.  I then 
evaluated the conditions on the ground to which refugees are returning in terms of 
structural and behavioral violence, which I will discuss in detail in the methodology 
employed.  Clearly, if these cases have a high violence rate, a sustainable life and 
successful reintegration is very unlikely.  As the dependent variables for this research, 
repatriation and reintegration success relies on two main factors: (1) the conditions on the 




The UNHCR9 provides a vast collection of numerical data on the amount of 
refugees worldwide as well as reports by its inspectors on the situation in refugee camps 
and repatriated areas.  For this research, I made use of UNHCR’s Handbook on Voluntary 
Repatriation: International Projection (1996), where I found the mandate of UNHCR’s 
voluntary repatriation programs as well as the methods (or strategies) to be employed.  
Overall, UNHCR is responsible for seeking whatever solution is best and permanent for 
the refugee population.  This is commonly achieved in cooperation with a third party (the 
state), whether it is the country of origin or another who is willing to integrate the 
Diaspora into its society (also known as resettlement).  A key component of any 
repatriation model employed is that it must be voluntary and it should be facilitated and 
promoted once the conditions are safe for the return.  Another component is the 
arrangement of conflict resolution with the country of origin, as well as constant 
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assistantship and monitoring of the conditions of returnees.  These conditions for 
repatriation are key to the evaluation of strategies employed in each case study. 
UNHCR also provides an extensive list of online publications on the situation of 
the countries in conflict (or countries of origin) as well of host countries.  Through 
reports by UNHCR inspectors, they inform of the limitations and success stories of 
groups returning and reintegrating, or integrating into a host country.  These reports 
served as a guide to determine the degree of success for reintegration. 
To complement the UNHCR reports, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU) and publications by the US Committee for Refugees (USCR) offer insightful 
details on the disadvantages of the process of return and the lack of ability for returnees 
to have a sustainable life.  They also point out the limitations encountered by UNHCR 
when addressing refugees’ needs. 
Another critique of the existing asylum policies is the work of Arthur C. Helton 
(2002).  He argues the importance of refugee studies has been overlooked, even though it 
is clearly a significant and growing issue.  He analyzes global policies and makes 
suggestions for new approaches (especially from the US).  He argues that the importance 
of refugees has been disregarded but it needs to be a priority in the agenda.  By attacking 
the problem of forced migration, the root comes down to the need of international 
cooperation before the crises occur.  He concludes his book by suggesting the re-
organization of humanitarian agencies in the US to deal with this growing matter.  This 
work is essential for this research, since it provides a study of existing policies of asylum 
and its limitations.  It also suggests solutions to the core of the problem of the 
indifference towards refugee populations. 
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Stephen J. Steadman’s and Fred Tanner (2003) provide another perspective of a 
new set of problems refugees encounter.  They argue that despite International 
Organizations and NGO’s efforts to aid refugees, some host countries (in a bilateral 
relationship) have manipulated diasporas for their own advantage.  In fact, the book’s 
contributors analyze how International Organizations have indirectly contributed to this 
manipulation.  There are 3 case studies in this book: Cambodian refugees along the Thai 
border in the 1970s and 1980s, Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire from 1994–96.  They conclude manipulation is 
allowed to occur because the international refugee regime and major states have not 
identified a consistent approach to stopping it.  In the post-Cold War era the United 
Nations and its members have chosen to treat the issue as a humanitarian problem instead 
of a security problem.  In other words, the main target to avoid forced migration should 
be to take preventive measures to avoid conflicts, persecution and ethnic violence.  
However, conflicts are not prevented, and the aftermath falls into patronizing 
humanitarian relief instead of aiming for security and preventive action.   This work, 
along with Helton’s, helped question the role of UNHCR as a real solution to the refugee 
situation. 
As an example of the impact returnees have had in past situations, I took into 
account the work of Lynellyn D. Long and Ellen Oxfeld (2004).  The book offers an 
anthropological approach through ethnography of several case studies of refugees.  The 
book mostly addresses the impact return movements have had in the country of origin as 
well as returnees’ state of mind.  They discuss the impact a life in exile has had and how 
these experiences shape attitudes when returning to the country of origin in different 
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panoramas: social, political economic and cultural.  Return is argued within the literature 
to be a way to mend past differences.  However, this book addresses the other side of the 
story; the re-fueling of pre-existing ethnic hatreds and how this makes repatriation a 
nightmare, rather than a reconstruction of the homeland.  Case studies include Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Vietnam, China, Philippines, German Jews, Nicaragua and Sarajevo.  The 
theoretical context of this book has been essential to this research, since it analyzed the 
general impact of repatriation not limited to the role of UNHCR.  
 Marjoleine Zieck (2004) analyzes the legal meaning of voluntary repatriation 
employed by the UNHCR, its place within the framework of universal refugee law, and 
whether or not it deserves to be called an “ideal” solution.  It provides a brief historical 
analysis of the birth of UNHCR’s mandate for voluntary repatriation, its evolution over 
the past 45 years, as well as four case studies: the voluntary repatriation of Cambodian 
refugees in 1980 and, again, in 1992 and 1993; of Iraqi (Kurdish) refugees in 1991; and 
of Mozambican refugees (from Malawi) in 1993 to 1995.  This book served as a 
framework for the explanation and analysis of UNHCR’s role in Guatemalan and Afghan 
Repatriation. 
 The US Committee for refugees (an NGO) has published several publications on 
the situation and statistics (qualitative and quantitative studies) of refugees around the 
world.  Its publication, El Retorno, describes into depth the risks Guatemalan returnees 
confront and presents a contradicting perspective of UNHCR’s optimism.  According to 
the USCR, the vision of conflict resolution was far fetched.  Despite the government’s 
agreements to limit military power towards civilians, returnees found quite the opposite.  
Conflict and ethnic differences are still present and threaten the Maya way of life.  This 
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publication will serve as additional analysis to the repatriation model employed in 
Guatemala.   
For further data on the case of Guatemalan refugees, Elizabeth Ferris has 
published several works on Central American refugees and the conflicting policies they 
have encountered.  For example, Mexico has been known for generous asylum policies, 
and feels an obligation to aid victims of violence from its neighboring countries.  
However, Mexico’s own economic problems have caused ambiguous policies.  In the US, 
on the other hand, Ferris argues that Central American refugees are often deported and 
their asylum application is commonly denied because of the fact that they choose not to 
stay in Mexico.  This demonstrated economic intentions and not political.  Ferris also 
discusses the many internal problems and pressure of the Mexican Commission for 
Refugee Aid (COMAR) that provides aid and political representation.   
Allan Burns, (1994) also provides anthropological study of the Guatemalan Maya 
refugee population in Indian Town, Florida.  He includes interviews with refugees, 
reports on the conditions they live in and opinions on the idea of repatriation (return to 
Guatemala) for them.  Overall he studies the cultural adaptation and “melting” pot of 
cultures of this Diaspora in South Florida.  Burns also analyses the US position on the 
situation for refugees and concludes it is one of “interference and ignorance,” since it has 
supported the Guatemalan government and even trained its army (since the overthrow of 
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in the 1950’s) and often does not recognize the Maya as 
refugees, but as immigrants seeking economic betterment.  The fact that most of their 
family members were killed in ethnic violence “was not enough to prove persecution or 
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to qualify for asylum.” Burns’ work will provide the perspective of repatriation for 
Guatemalans in the US. 
Commission for Historical Clarification has published Guatemala Memory of 
Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, where it provides an 
examination of the causes, origins and effect of the internal armed confrontation and on 
more than 9,000 interviews.  It presents the methods of the violence, its consequences 
and effects.  The conclusions are then presented and are followed by recommendations to 
the United Nations.  The report provides historical clarification of the atrocities 
committed in Guatemala by the National Army after the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán, and aims to promote an open dialogue of events.  The commission therefore 
pointed out the weakness of the Guatemalan government and strongly criticized North 
American role in its support.  The report also provides data on the proportion of people 
killed in the civil war and the forces responsible for the human rights violations.  This 
analysis is essential to understand the pattern of genocide in Guatemala as well as the 
actions taken to resolve and mend internal relationships, since the CEH has played an 
active role in the supervision of mending relations. 
For the case of Afghanistan’s background, I will refer to the work of Larry 
Goodson in his book Afghanistan’s Endless War: State failure, Regional Politics and the 
Rise of the Taliban.  Goodson discusses the aftermath of the Cold War era and how 
conflicts never ceased after this disruption.  He also discussed in detail how historical 
factors have shaped Afghan society and its destruction.   
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has performed numerous 
evaluations on the returnee situation in Afghanistan.  It also addresses the limitations 
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undergone by UNHCR due to the unexpected amount of returnees and the ongoing 
pressure of its donors.  They asses the focus of humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan 
has focused in the immediate survival of returnees and has not taken into account that 
state rebuilding is needed (and is often a pre-condition) for social stability.  Within these 
studies I found a clear explanation of how external factors led to the failure of UNHCR’s 
strategy in Afghan repatriation. 
UNHCR’s publications also provide an extensive collection of reports on the 
repatriation patterns in Afghanistan.  The framework of these patters is discussed into 
detail as well as the impact in the local socio-economic aspects.  These reports will serve 
as a glance into the reported situation.  However, for the purpose of this research, I 
extended the image of the situation by providing a deeper analysis of the levels of 
violence in each country of origin.  To do so, I employed an empirical method of a 
“violence indicator” as proposed by Gernot Kohler and Norman Alcock (1976).  This 
measurement provided a clear perspective for the conditions in the ground of each 
country.  The indicators are classified into two levels: Structural Violence and Behavioral 
Violence.  The first measured conditions that lower life expectancy due to the state’s 
failure to protect citizens from life-threatening danger or from the lack of resources.  The 
latter indicates armed conflict.  For the purpose of this research the same criteria will be 
used to measure the conditions of each case at the time of repatriation until today.    
For the gathering of this data, I have used statistical and demographical 
information from The World Health Organization (WHO), since it provides country 
reports on the deaths related to malnutrition, exposure or lack of resources for each 
country.  This helped account for structural violence.  Along with the UNHCR field 
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reports of the situation of repatriated areas, this has been a main source of measuring the 
conditions at the country of origin.  
Another source for the gathering of data reflecting the situation in the ground was 
Marshal’s database of Political Violence (2005).  Here, Marshal offers a comprehensive 
account of every outbreak of political violence from 1946 to 2004.  This data set includes 
the nature of the conflict, dates, number of casualties, magnitude of the impact it had in 
society and the states involved.  This data accounted for the behavioral violence in the 
country of repatriation. 
Overall, existing research has gathered and evaluated numerical data on the 
amount of refugees, the impact of forced migration for refugees and host countries, or the 
causes of forced migration.  As for the issue of reintegration, the data is limited to 
briefing notes and situation reports by UNHCR field officials in particular regions of 
interest to UNHCR.  I have found no formal and inclusive analysis of the actual situation 
of returnees after repatriation patterns took place that evaluates structural and behavioral 
violence, thereby evaluating the safety of returnees and stability of the country. 
 
Significance of my contribution 
 
This study questions the methodology of repatriation and reintegration patterns, 
and how human life is affected by the complexity of these situations.  It will also question 
the effectiveness of International Organizations’ role in conflict resolution and permanent 
solutions such as repatriation. 
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 Previous literature discusses social, legal situation of refugees, or merely describe 
the integration into their original or into a different society.  Publications by the 
UNHCR’s Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) describe how the process of 
repatriation was carried out and provide a limited explanation of reintegration.  These 
studies exist for very few cases, including Guatemala, Rwanda and South East Asia.  
These are concluded with suggestions for future repatriation models.  However, I intend 
to provide a comparative analysis of different regions and how the repatriation and 
reintegration process remains today and its success rate.  That is, to what extent and in 
which circumstances has reintegration been a success?  This study also provides an up to 




This thesis employs case studies of Guatemala and Afghanistan.  I have employed 
cross-regional case studies to test the hypotheses in diverse environments.  These two 
cases have similar situations in a cross-cultural setting that make these countries worth 
analyzing.  First, the origin of the conflict dates back to the Cold War period and they 
have been argued to be pawns of Cold War strategies and foreign intervention that 
disrupted each country’s stability and led to prolonged civil wars.10  Second, UNHCR has 
carried out intensive and relatively successful repatriation strategies involving millions of 
refugees from these three countries. Third, these three cases provide a regional 
representation of some of the most severe (yet often neglected) cases of war and forced 
migration in their region, since none of them received foreign intervention to prevent the 
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conflict(s) that created the diasporas.  Most importantly, all three cases involve a rural 
population whose sustainable livelihoods were destroyed by extended civil war.  At the 
time of repatriation, these refugees found themselves with the similar situation: No 
suitable land to resume their lifestyle as land laborers. 
After extensive analysis of the strategy employed by UNHCR, it was found that 
strategies proposed to follow fixed guidelines in both cases.  Therefore, by using these 
two cases, I will be controlling for the policy proposed.  In reality, the strategies 
demonstrated to have disparity in the treatment of returnees despite the proposed actions 
required by the UNHCR mandate for voluntary repatriation.  In addition, both cases have 
been categorized as a type “3 intensity” at their highest level of warfare according to the 
Peace Research Institute of Norway.11  Therefore, both conflicts account for a similar 
number of casualties and for a similar scale of violence.  In summary, the study of these 
two cases will maximize variation for the primary explanatory factor (which is the 
condition in the ground of the country of origin) and will in turn minimize the variation 
for the control variables (which are UNHCR strategies and type of conflict).  This way, I 
will be able to effectively evaluate the effect of the chosen strategies by UNHCR in 
different conditions.  
The thesis has five chapters, including this introduction.  The second chapter will 
discuss UNHCR’s Mandate in detail and provide examples of how it has fulfilled (or 
failed to do so in certain instances) its goals for voluntary repatriation and reintegration.  
It will also discuss the repatriation program employed in each case and a discussion of 
their effectiveness.  In both cases UNHCR employed strategies of mediation and peace 
accords before commencing repatriation, monitoring human rights, providing education, 
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medical attention and aiding the development of humane standards of living.  All of these 
steps and their effect on establishing a suitable environment for return will be analyzed.  
 The next two chapters (chapters 3 and 4) provide the analysis of the individual 
cases.  I address each case study in the same pattern.  I briefly discuss cultural and social 
issues that make the persecuted population different from the oppressors.  I also address 
the history of the conflict or persecution, foreign intervention, and consequences of the 
conflict: number of casualties, number of internally and externally displaced.  I briefly 
address where the displaced population sought refuge, the patterns of intervention of 
UNHCR and when applicable, of the cooperation with the local government and NGO’s.  
Finally, the conditions in the ground after repatriation were evaluated based on the model 
of measurement of violence by Gernot Kohler & Norman Alcock (1976).  Violence is 
seen as a key factor for the proper integration of returnees, since it determines the degree 
of safety upon return.  This rate of violence was evaluated for each case and will 
determined the ability (or lack of) for returnees to rebuild their homes and to achieve a 
successful reintegration.  Violence was main indicator for the condition in the ground and 
was stratified according to Kholer and Alcock’s model of structural and behavioral 
violence.   
The equation for structural violence (as used by Kohler and Alcock) is as follows: 
 Pn  Pn 
V  =  - 
 En  C 
 
Where  Pn = Population of the sample (country) 
 En = Life Expectancy of the sample (country) 
 C = Egalitarian Life Expectancy  
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 V = Structural Violence 
 
Despite variations in other literature in violence indicators, Kohler and Alcock’s 
model is uncomplicated and broad enough to obtain the general grasp of life threatening 
conditions that lower life expectancy in each country.   I chose an egalitarian (or global) 
value of life expectancy to have a common baseline of comparison at the international 
level for the situation in these two countries.  With this equation, a positive value of “V” 
indicates a higher level of structural violence, while a negative value would indicate a 
lower level when compared to the global standard.  The Egalitarian life expectancy “C” 
was obtained through previous investigations by WHO, where a “Health-Adjusted Life 
Expectancy” (HALE) was obtained.  HALE is based on life expectancy at birth but 
includes an adjustment for time spent in poor health.  It is most easily understood as the 
equivalent number of years in full health that a newborn can expect to live based on 
current rates of ill-health and mortality.12  Behavioral violence levels according to 
previous quantification methods will also be used to picture the likelihood of stability, 
since this will have a direct impact in the livelihood of returnees. 
The last chapter will provide a summation of all the data found and conclusions 
on the relationship of UNHCR’s strategy, today’s outcome of reintegration of former 
refugees, and what leads to the failure of reintegration. 
 
Conclusion 
The findings of the repatriation and reintegration success rate ultimately relied in 
the stability of the country of origin.  On the other hand, stability in the country of origin 
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relies on the success of conflict resolution and the establishing of peaceful relations 
among citizens and government.  Conflict resolution and an end to ethnic violence have 
been recognized as a key components for the conditions of return according to UNHCR’s 
mandate.  Hence, without peace the success of reintegration is unlikely. 
In general, I found varied results of reintegration success rate.  Guatemala has 
proven to be a more controlled project with the formation of the Comisión de 
Escalrecimiento Histórico (CEH) as an agent of defense to victims and returnees and for 
the clarification of events that took place in the civil war.  With this agency in control, 
Guatemala aimed for the reconstruction of relationships before opening its arms to 
massive returnee movement.  Afghanistan on the other hand, commenced massive 
repatriation without the insurance of socio-political stability.  The equivalent of the CEH 
in Afghanistan is the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), which has been 
analyzing the degree of stability and sustainability after mass repatriation has taken place.  
With the quantification of structural violence, it was clear that the difference in Health-
Adjusted Life Expectancy in the two cases was quite different.  Structural violence in 
Afghanistan was significantly higher than in Guatemala.  Therefore, the following thesis 
was reached: The Afghan encashment program proved to be an ineffective way for 
achieving reintegration, due to the lack of proper monitoring and insurance of stability 
prior to repatriation.  On the other hand, Guatemala’s “hands-on” escort and monitoring 
programs were more appropriate ways of reintegrating returnees. 
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CHAPTER II  
UNHCR’s Mandate and Strategies 
This chapter discusses the guidelines for voluntary repatriation as stated in 
UNHCR’s mandate.  For the focus of this research the analysis of the implementation 
of these steps will be analyzed from the insurance of safety in terms of structural and 
behavioral violence.  In order to do so, I have pointed out the strategies that may or 
may not have placed a risk for returnees.  It is important to specify that strategies are 
not necessarily a direct cause for detrimental conditions of returnees.  The cause for 
unsuccessful reintegration and stability may often be a result of unexpected or 
unwanted developments.  However, it was common to find lack of proper analysis 
and prospects for the future before promoting and initiating mass returns. 
 
UNHCR’s Mandate for Voluntary Repatriation 
 UNHCR seeks permanent solutions for refugees by assisting, host countries and 
countries of origin (as well as NGO’s) to facilitate the movement and protection of 
returnees.  This is, of course, in the case that the UNHCR deems the conditions in the 
ground as “suitable” and “safe” for return.  One critical condition for return is for it to 
be voluntary, and the entities participating have a role of facilitating and promoting a 
safe return.  The personal decision to return therefore implies there is no longer fear 
of persecution in the country of origin.  Involuntary repatriation (or Deportation) to 




 The mandate also states UNHCR will only promote voluntary repatriation if the 
country of origin agrees of the active role of UNHCR in the repatriation process.  The 
“active role” consists of the following activities: 
1. Establishing and ensuring the voluntary nature of the return 
2. Promoting governments’ assistance and involvement in the process 
3. Establishing the assurance of conflict resolution  
4. Education among the refugee population of the current conditions at the country 
of origin 
5. Constant monitoring of the return process and the results 
6. Assistance in the reintegration process.  Aid could be monetary, material or 
political and will include the funding and organization of transportation and 
establishment for returnees.  
The insurance of safety and security, as discussed by the mandate, includes the 
full acceptance of the returnees by the National Authorities, full restoration of their 
rights and the equal access to physical security (which mean physical protection from 
armed conflict or remaining landmines), material security (to be able to have 
sustainable livelihoods), and the eradication of all discrimination.   
In summary, the role UNHCR plays in voluntary repatriation is ideally one of 
seeking permanent solutions, promotion and facilitation of return.  For the promotion 
of solutions, UNHCR follows certain criteria: 
1. Aim to resolve the root causes of the forced migration with national, regional and 
international efforts. 
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2. Creating a humanitarian, non-political space that will engage in peaceful dialogue 
for the resolution of the root causes. 
3. Consultation and involvement of the refugee population in the decision-making 
process, thereby making them an active part of the process 
4. The will of the country of origin must be followed.   
5. The cooperation of the international community to promote the conditions of 
return must be achieved.  
In addition, the promotion of repatriation must have the following essential 
pre-conditions: 
1. Voluntary character 
2. A general improvement of the situation of the country of origin 
3. Formal guarantee (i.e. Agreement, Treaty…) of the country of origin’s 
improvement for the a safe return and integration  
4. UNHCR’s complete access to refugees and returnees 
5. The terms and conditions of return must be fully discussed in a formal 
repatriation agreement between UNHCR and the country of origin. 
 
Recently, UNHCR has modified its repatriation tactics into more stratified 
procedures.  The Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (2003) offers 
seven modules to be employed in each situation, each of them with a different approach 
according to the country’s or the refugees’ needs.  Even though no repatriation model has 
been organized using these new modules, these are meant to be courses of action for 
future.  The modules include detailed examples of what previous models might teach us 
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for the future.  For instance, modules 2 and 3 make reference to examples of the case of 
Afghanistan, and certain policies employed have provided the framework for new and 
improved approaches for future repatriation planning.   
In theory, the involvement of UNHCR in the repatriation and reintegration process 
present the ideal approach to benefit refugees who want to return.  On the other hand, the 




The movement of refugees to host countries such as Pakistan and Iran began in 1978, 
after the Saur Revolution.  Today, movement along the borders in search for safety and 
employment is still frequent.  In 1988 a Bilateral Agreement was signed between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Later, agreements were made between the UN, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan that ensured the voluntary nature of the return and defined the general 
characteristics of the assistance that would be provided to returnees.13  This repatriation 
agreement is still effective and will end by the Summer of 2006.  In Iran, the agreement 
ended May 2005 and due to a larger integration of refugees into Iranian society, 
repatriation has not reached a massive scale.14   Over 700,000 Afghans returned home 
from Iran and Pakistan during the first nine months of 2004 alone.  The total number of 
returns since March 2002 has reached over 3.5 million. 
Strategies in Afghan repatriation were initiated with the assumption that the 
necessary pre-conditions mentioned above were achieved.  However, Afghanistan has 
been living a lifestyle where the use of force and violence was the way to solve disputes 
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and assertion of power.15  These patterns have been nearly impossible to eradicate in 
Afghan society, especially with the US’s reinforcement of the “warlord strategy” to 
combat the Taliban and its supporters.  Unfortunately, the US led intervention has 
unveiled a problem when trying to eradicate another one.  With the reinforcement of the 
warlord regime, peace, stability and the monitoring of human rights have been and will 
continue to be difficult according to Human Rights Watch.  In addition, the Taliban has 
shown a significant wave of insurrection even at the time of repatriation.  The 
cooperation of the international community has proven to be one of the most difficult 
tasks in Afghanistan, since despite efforts of the Bonn Agreement signed in December 
2001 neighboring countries have continued to support the Taliban.  
The complete access to returnees by the UNHCR also proved to be impossible in 
Afghanistan due to the vast amount of movement along the Afghan-Pakistani border.  
Keeping track of returnees was not properly accomplished with the Encashment Program 
of Return in Pakistan after the end of Soviet occupation.  The encashment was often a 
grant of US $100.00 and 300 kilograms of wheat to cover expenses and nutrition for the 
trip back to Afghanistan.  At times, due to economic restraints, the cash grant was 
lowered to $30.00 USD.  This did not ensure the actual return or the time of return.  After 
the grant, there was a “deregistration” of the refugee and the end of assistance, thereby 
offering an apparently cost effective method of promoting repatriation.   
Refugees who took the encashment grant either remained in Pakistan after taking the 
cash and food or attempted to return to Afghanistan.  Some of the returnees often 
returned to Pakistan due to the lack of establishing sustainable livelihoods and because a 
high level of socio-political instability.16  Without the proper monitoring, hardship is even 
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more intense.  Once they had been deregistered, refugees had no protection from 
UNHCR and became clandestine immigrants in Pakistan.   Clandestine communities have 
been tolerated in Pakistan, yet refugees often have no access to employment, health or 
education.17  Therefore, the encashment strategy has not only adversely affected 
returnees, but also the refugees living at the host countries.  By 1988, conditions in 
Afghanistan were not safe enough for the food distribution and the ongoing drought made 
subsistence farming impossible.  Hence, the notorious pattern of “recyclers” began a 
cycle that would create a barrier for further improvement of the management of 
repatriation programs.  The recycling of UNHCR repatriation packages led to stricter and 
costly screening processes to avoid the misuse of the system.  For instance, in some 
encashment centers today, iris-screening tests are implemented to make sure refugees 
have not received assistance previously.18 
An evaluation of UNHCR’s encashment program employed in Afghanistan argues it 
will aid refugees who voluntarily want to return even when conditions are not favorable.  
In the case of Afghanistan however, the fact that refugees in Pakistan often had no source 
of income made the encashment a source of “fast cash” and food.  Policy evaluation also 
stresses out the advantages of reinforcing individual decision-making among refugees.19  
However, among the active roles assigned to the UNHCR, a constant monitoring of the 
return process and the results is difficult (if not impossible) with the encashment 
program.  Attempts for a better monitoring of repatriation has been directed to avoid 
recyclers and not to assess the situation in Afghanistan nor to insure proper reintegration. 
The complete destruction of the country’s infrastructure and private homes meant 
returnees were coming back to be homeless and to have no facilities for healthcare or 
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education for children.  To respond to this serious issue, UNHCR and Afghan authorities 
build 100,000 shelters that housed 1.5 million returnees.  In 2004, 22 million (USD) were 
assigned for the construction of 20,500 more shelters.  To fight the poverty issue, 
UNHCR has also organized local “cash for work” programs where returnees were paid 
for construction labor of the shelters.20 
A strategy for reintegration that proved to be successful was the “cash-for-work” 
program.  For instance, with the repatriation package, refugees often received woven 
blankets done by returnees themselves and purchased by the UNHCR to be given out to 
future returnees.  This not only generated employment and cash flow among returnees, 
but it also integrated them into the economy.  Multi fuel stoves were also manufactured 
and sold by returnees and provided to those who were to return.21 
Despite the recognition of lack of security and the intensification of hostility towards 
electoral, governmental and humanitarian workers, the plans for repatriation are still 
present.  With the past limitations and setbacks, UNHCR has reinvented the course of 
action for this year.  Within its publication for Global Appeal for 2005, 22 it presents a 
proposal for the course of action for future repatriations.  They propose deeper protection 
and monitoring of refugees by strengthening relations with the Afghan Independent 
Human Rights Commission, NGO’s and other UN groups.  They also propose the 
training of law enforcers in refugee and human rights to avoid future occurrence of 
gender-based violence.  Encashment strategies will still be employed, with limitations to 
the most needy individuals.  UNHCR states in the report it plans on reducing the material 
and monetary aid and replacing it for a protection-oriented program by offering more 
legal aid centers for refugees and asylum seekers, and establishing networks to promote 
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the advocacy of refugee protection.  Access to proper health care, clean water and 
children’s education will remain a priority for 2005.  Also, there will be an emphasis on 
the promotion of empowerment strategies that will encourage deeper self-sufficiency of 
individuals.  As seen in the proposed budget, the two activities with higher funding are 
protection, monitoring and coordination and health: 
Budget, 2005 (USD) 
Activities and Services Annual Program 
Protection, monitoring and coordination 9,055,754 
Community services 454,322 




Legal assistance 1,616,191 
Operational support (to agencies) 1,425,989 
Sanitation 138,222 
Transport/logistics 284,471 
Water (non-agricultural) 568,513 
Total Operations 21,972,554 
Program support 2,498,161 
Total 24,470,715 
Proposed budget for activities in Afghan repatriation 
Source: UNHCR Global Appeal 2005 
 
 Allocations of these funds are limited to UNHCR and do not include budget from 
other NGO’s and International Organizations.  For instance, UN World food program has 
projected 168.3 million (USD) will be assigned to Afghanistan this year.23 
In Iran there is clearly a smaller population of Afghan refugees.  As mentioned 
earlier, repatriation from Iran has also been less numerous since refugees were highly 
integrated in Iranian labor and society.  In addition, the absence of camps has caused the 
refugee population to spread thought Iran in search of employment and well-being.  
However, due to the increasing pressure of governmental policies aimed to restrict further 
Afghan integration, UNHCR has had to increase its repatriation efforts in the country. 
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Shelters will also be reduced to 10,000 units and reserved for the most vulnerable 
populations.24  UNHCR will also promote the return of professionals that had fled 
Afghanistan, thereby trying to reverse the problems caused by the country’s “brain 
drain.”  It also proposes to increase the cash-for-work programs and to promote income-
generating activities that include all women and men. 
In Islamabad, Pakistan plans stand for the shutting down of all the refugee camps 
inside the western tribal belt, the area along Afghanistan’s borders.  Recent reports for 
June 2005 state that around 83% of camp residents in Waziristan have chosen to 
repatriate after a series of military invasions and harassment by Pakistani authorities in 
mid-2004 in search for extremist terrorist organizations.  Unto this pressure, UNHCR has 




 The first attempt for repatriation in Guatemala took place in 1986 as an initiative 
of the Guatemalan government and monitored by the army.  However, this movement 
turned out to be a strategy from the army to keep the population under direct control and 
to suppress insurrection and political activism.  A second attempt was made.  This time, 
the exiled at Mexico and the Guatemalan government negotiated a unified movement of 
returnees at with the requests and conditions of refugees themselves.  Here, the 
Guatemalan government and refugees took the first few steps for mending relations. 
 UNHCR intervened in 1993, where unlike the case of Afghanistan, transportation 
from the host country to the country of origin was provided (not just promoted) by 
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UNHCR.  The returnees were also accompanied by health workers and foreign observers 
and escorted to their new settlement by Guatemalan government officials, UNHCR, the 
Red Cross and the Comisiones Permanentes (representatives of refugees).25  UNHCR 
was also directly involved in community training programs that included vocational 
studies, and awareness of the aftermath of war (such as land mine awareness).  Within the 
communities, women’s integration has received strong emphasis as one of UNHCR’s 
main goals.  However, at the time of the first repatriation wave, many argued the political 
climate in Guatemala was suitable for flight rather than return.  Human rights abuses 
were still present at the time of repatriation. 
In order to watch over the security in the region, UNHCR assigned officers to the 
repatriated areas to file reports of the situation.  For example, Roberto Mignone reported 
the returnee situation at Cuarto Pueblo, where refugees were back to restore their land.  
Thanks to the UNHCR and CECI of Canada, small farming projects have been 
established.  Mignone reports of the cheerful fiestas in the village and how happy the 
population seems to be despite incidents of still un-detonated land mines posing a threat 
to the communities. 
The evaluation and policy analysis center for UNHCR presents limitations 
undergone by the Guatemala operation.  Paula Worby argues the constant change in 
management personnel presented obstacles when properly addressing the problems that 
needed to be solved.  On the other hand, frequent and prolonged visits (and reports) from 
UNHCR officials to repatriated areas ensured UHNCR was fully informed of the 
situations. 
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Strategies in Guatemala focused on protection and were grouped into three main 
categories.  The use of mediation and newly established commissions to ease conflicts 
and differences between returnees and the government and/or their other Guatemalan 
cittizens in part as a strategy of prevention against future displacements;  
1. Promotion of the exercise of other basic civil rights through personal and land 
documentation;  
2. Prevention of human rights violations, monitoring of human rights cases and 
subsequent follow-up;  
3. Prevention of human rights violations, monitoring of human rights cases and 
subsequent follow-up. 
With the establishment of the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH, or 
“Truth Commission”) in 1994, historical investigation of Guatemala’s war has changed 
the face of reconciliation.  As CEH’s main purpose, it has broken with the patterns of 
silence and fear of former victims and empowered them to speak out and mobilize 
themselves.  According to CEH, this is the first and most important step for true 
reconciliation of Guatemalan society.  It has offered thousands of Guatemalans an 
opportunity to denounce the abuses they had suffered and the forensic anthropologists 
have allowed families to give decent burials to their loved ones. Together, the two efforts 
have provided overwhelming proof regarding the scope and nature of the killing that took 
place.  The local rights groups, meanwhile, have had a few significant court victories and, 
in the process, have done more than anyone to make Guatemala's justice system begin to 
fulfill its function as the guarantor of human rights. 
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Afghanistan has been devastated with 23 years of war and over 5 years of a 
drought that makes the establishment of sustainable lives virtually impossible, especially 
for the rural population.  Nonetheless, UNHCR has been overwhelmed with the vast 
amount of returnees.  For such a massive return, researchers and scholars have questioned 
why these refugees returned. Extensive investigation from Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit (AREU) has explained why would refugees return to such instability and 
poverty.  They conclude the main reasons for return were the following: 
• The wish to return home due to negative experiences in exile. 
• Assistance package given by UNHCR was a form of income. This promoted 
what they call “recyclers”, or people who claimed to want to return, collected 
the assistance, went to Afghanistan and returned to the host country. 
• Expectations were too optimistic.  Aid was promised for the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan and there was a promise of stability re-enforced by an 
international military presence. 
• Pressure and harassment were common at the countries of asylum, especially 
in Pakistan.  Overall, the acceptance of refugees was a religious and 
humanitarian action; not a legal obligation. 
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The main problem plaguing the repatriation and reintegration pattern in 
Afghanistan has been the vast amount of returnees for a small budget.  The promised 
international aid did not arrive at the expected time or never arrived at all.  In addition, 
donors were mainly interested in the mere survival of returnees, not on state re-building.  
This proved to be a flawed approach, since stability and the assurance of security are 
essential for the reintegration of returnees.  Consequently, UNHCR saw itself failing to 
comply with is own mandate.   
On the other hand, a massive-scale return had several implications for the 
international community.  First, it gave the Afghan government a vote of confidence and 
an unfounded pretense of stability.  It also justified the intervention for the overthrow of 
the Taliban and gave a deeper sense of validity to the international organizations 
involved.  For the host countries (mostly Pakistan and Iran), Afghan repatriation meant a 
reduction of the “economic burden” refugees represented.  Therefore, mass repatriation 
increased at a rate that would destabilize Afghan society.   
As in the case of Guatemala, the distinction between economic migrants and 
refugees is a thin line that is often crossed.  Nonetheless, Afghanistan’s ongoing drought 
and the aftermath of 23 years of war left the agricultural sector in ruins and the rural 
population was consequently unable to make a living once they returned.  This has 
created an ongoing dilemma in the classification of who is a refugee and who is an 






 Afghan history has been shaped according to its location.  It lies in the route 
between India, Iran and serves as the gateway to central Asia.  Afghan rugged terrains 
isolate tribal unities, thereby creating a diverse cultural affinity and hindering national 
unity.  As travelers passed through the region, urban centers began to emerge.  The region 
Afghanistan was then conquered by the Persian King Darius I and later by Alexander the 
Great on his way to India.  After Alexander’s death, the region went from dynasty to 
dynasty.  This period also brought religious diversity.  Buddhism was introduced in the 
2nd Century B.C.  Islamic conquests began in the 7th Century and marked the beginning of 
unity efforts that today make up most of the Afghan state.  Afghans had received the 
name of “Durranis”, a term that is still used today. 
 Emir Dost Muhammad came to power in 1826 as a strong and prominent leader, 
yet soon encountered problems with foreign influence.  The British, in hopes of 
controlling the route to India, tried to replace him with a former Emir who was supportive 
of British motives and policies.  This intervention led to the Afghan War from 1838 to 
1842.  Despite the temporary overthrow of Dost Muhammad, rebel groups in Kabul 
helped restore the existing government.  An alliance was later signed with the British. 
 Another foreign intervention was from Russians who claimed portions of northern 
Afghanistan.  This and more territorial disputes with the British led to a second war in 
Afghanistan in 1878.  Border agreements were later negotiated with Russia, Persia and 
British India.  However, with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, Afghan 
independence was granted with the condition that Britain would have control on foreign 
affairs.  In 1919, Emir Amanullah attempted to break with British influence and invaded 
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India.  This was known as the third Afghan War and the outcome granted Afghanistan 
full control of its foreign affairs. 
 Amanullah also attempted the modernization of Afghanistan by adopting western 
ideals.  He reduced the influence of religious leaders in governmental affairs and 
increased freedom for women.  This motivated opposition among tribes and eventually 
led to his removal in 1929.  Power was briefly taken by a tribal leader but was later 
defeated by Amanullah’s cousin, Muhammad Nadir Khan who was proclaimed Shah.   
 Afghanistan was affected by a drought and severe economic hardship.  As a 
consequence, a group of young militants accused King Muhammad Zahir Khan of 
mishandling the economy.  This group then proclaimed a republic with Lt. Muhammed 
Dahud Khan in power.  In 1978 he was ousted and a Marxist regime was established with 
close ties to the USSR.  However, in 1979, the head of state was killed and the regime 
toppled, hence the developing of the Afghanistan War (1979 to 1989).  The USSR 
consequently invaded and a Soviet-supported president was put into power.  During this 
time, the Mujahidin guerrilla movement, or “Islamic warriors” were an avid opposition to 
the soviet forces and to their supporters.  This made them a strategic group for the Cold 
War politics of the time and for the weakening of the Soviet Union.  As a consequence, 
the Mujahidin were supported by aid from US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran.  They 
gained full control of the rugged mountains and rural areas.  The Soviets on the other 
hand initially had control of the urban sectors.  Despite Afghan victory, the war took an 
enormous toll on the economy, human life and overall, caused a wave of massive human 
displacement.  Over 1 million Afghans died and 5 million sought refuge in neighboring 
countries - mainly Pakistan and Iran.  At the time, over 2% of the county was covered in 
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landmines, thereby making it difficult for civilians to return to their homes.  Also, 
guerrilla forces were not able to properly unite for the nation's reconstruction.  
Afghanistan therefore became a patchwork of individually ruled areas that constantly 
opposed the newly established government under Burhanuddin Rabbani.  This created the 
favorable panorama for the rise of the Taliban regime a militia of Pashtun Islamic 
fundamentalists.   
 In 1994 the Taliban gained power.  By 1996, a power-sharing accord was signed.  
However, the Taliban intervened militarily, taking control of Kabul and proclaimed the 
"Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", imposing fundamentalist and extremely restrictive 
laws.  Internal conflict continued, as the Taliban enforced authoritarian laws that made 
Fundamental Islam an absolute power.  Despite UN's economic sanctions and the lack of 
international recognition as a legitimate power, the Taliban continued to gain control.  By 
then, constant warfare and drought brought dire conditions to Afghanistan. 
 Post 9/11, the U.S. developed interest in Afghanistan, since Bin Laden was 
thought to be hiding here.  The US demanded the surrender of Bin Laden, yet the Taliban 
refused to hand him over.  Several thousand U.S. troops began entering the country in 
November, mainly to concentrate on the search for bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah 
Muhammad Omar and to deal with the remaining pockets of their forces.  Additionally, a 
clandestine opposition to the Taliban known as the Northern Alliance, with the help of 
U.S. air support, took over successfully the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul.  On 
December 7, the Taliban regime fell, and its troops fled their last stronghold, Kandahar.  
However, al-Qaeda members and other Mujahideen who had earlier fought with and 
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supported the Taliban continued to fight for the control of Afghanistan.  This forced U.S. 
and allied troops to remain in Afghanistan.  
 In June 2002, Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun (the dominant ethnic group in the country) 
became president and a multiparty republic replaced an interim government that had been 
established in Dec. 2001.  The U.S. and NATO maintained troops to combat the remnants 
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  However, attacks on American-led forces intensified since 
the war, and warlords continued to have regional control.  In a highly aggressive and 
uncharacteristic move, Karzai attempted to restraint one of the most powerful warlords, 
Ismail Khan, by removing him from Herat, a western province, in 2004. Violent protests 
followed Khan's ouster.  
 By October of 2004, Afghanistan held its first democratic elections for president.  
Former king Muhammad Zarzai Khan had returned from exile to lead the interim 
government and was later elected as president.  Opposition was still a treat.  In fact, his 
vice president was assassinated and an attempt was done to kill the newly elected 
president.  However, there has been a relative stabilization on the region, and UNHCR 
has estimated that over 3 million Afghan refugees have voluntarily returned to their 
hometown to rebuild Afghanistan.  Reconstruction has been slowly progressing; therefore 
it is difficult to control rural areas.  In January of 2004, a new constitution was passed 
that grants rights to minority groups.  However, tensions continue among the Pashtun 
majority and other ethnic groups 
 The country itself largely reverted to the control of the regional warlords who 
held power before the Taliban. Therefore, a strong central government is still in 
formation and not in control.  Britain, Canada, and other NATO nations provided forces 
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for various military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.  Other nations also 
agreed to contribute humanitarian aid.  The United Nations estimated that $28.5 billion 
would be needed over the next years to effectively rebuild Afghanistan, yet this amount 
has not been gathered.  
 Today, security in Afghanistan remains questionable.  Human rights abuses have 
continued with a high concentration in most of the northern region.  There is also a high 
incidence of illegal taxation, occupation of land and discrimination against minority 
groups.  In addition, returnees in the northern rural region have no property and often 
cannot sustain their families.27 
 
Afghan Social structure 28 
 Afghanistan's history of the last years has been a history of war and devastation. 
The country's ancient culture, the treasures of the past, (which still exist despite the 
destruction caused by the Taliban), were almost forgotten. Social life also was badly 
affected; only very slowly can Afghanistan re-discover its own identity, which never 
resembled the Taliban's fundamentalism.29 
 According to Valentine Moghadam (1993) modernization and women’s rights in 
Afghanistan has depended on two factors: the patriarchal nature of society and a weak 
central State.  A strong state has the ability of influencing society, regulating social 
relations and resources.  Afghanistan has not been able to do any of this due to the strong 
ties and loyalty to the local tribal culture and because of the geographical boundaries that 
made communication and human contact difficult.  The government under the monarchy 
often called for modernization and especially for women’s rights that failed. 
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 Afghanistan’s pre-Taliban society was commonly fragmented into tribes (Gablia) 
or communal groups (Gawm).  Therefore, ethnic, religious and tribal divisions 
maintained local independence and often showed reluctance towards a central 
government. Geography helps isolate these communities and consolidate differences, 
since the rugged terrain has made it costly and hard for communications between central 
government and tribes.  Among the 5 most prominent groups are the Pashtuns (which are 
the majority), Persian speaking Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks and the Baluchs.30 Urban 
sectors were formed as facilitators of transit for trade, and markets among local tribes 
were not integrated.  Therefore, there was a lack of formation of a central national 
economy.  Nationalism and the concept of Nation-State are absent within most of the 
population.  As a consequence, modernizing attempts had ended up in tribal rebellion 
towards center authority. 
 The Pre-Taliban regime was also characterized by foreign intrusion, since 
Afghanistan was a pawn of the former USSR and US cold war.  Despite a truce in 
February 1989, the pro-Soviet government of President Najibullah was left in charge.  By 
mid-April 1992 Najibullah was overthrown and Islamic rebels advanced on the capital.  
Different rebel groups began fighting one another for control.  In the middle of the chaos 
of competing factions, the Taliban (consisting of Islamic students) seized control of 
Kabul in September 1996.  This take-over completely disrupted Afghan way of life by 
imposing unwanted and severe fundamentalist laws (including stoning for adultery and 
severing hands for theft).  Women were banned from the work force and from school.  
They were also required to cover themselves from head to foot in public.  By fall 1998, 
the Taliban controlled about 90% of the country and, with its devastating tactics and 
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human rights abuses, had turned itself into an international exile.  Only three countries, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, recognized the Taliban as Afghanistan's legitimate 
government.31  
 
The Refugee Population 
Afghan refugees account for the largest population of interest for the UNHCR, 
due to the massive number of displaced people – internally and externally.  UNHCR’s 
statistical report (2004) estimated over 2,136,000 from 1994 to 2003, therefore 
accounting for the largest group of refugees in recent history. 
Origin of major refugee populations in 
2003 (ten largest groups) 
Afghanistan  2,136,000 
Sudan  606,200 
Burundi  531,600 
DR Congo  453,400 
Palestinians   427,900 
Somalia  402,200 
Iraq  368,500 
Viet Nam  363,200 
Liberia  353,300 
Angola  329,600 
Origin of major refugee populations in 2003 (ten largest groups) 
Source: UNHCR Statistical Report, 2004 
 
Just like Afghan culture is not uniform, neither has been the refugee population.  
Pashtuns composed 80% of refugees in Pakistan.  In Pakistani camps, there was higher 
health care than in the war-torn Afghanistan.  Families averaged from 8 to 9 members.  In 
Afghanistan they averaged 6 due to a higher mortality rate among children.32 
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In Pakistan, men at times integrate into the local work force, while women remain 
in camps.  Seclusion of women is related to “honor” and preservation of personal identity 
in the presence of external pressure.  This was mostly due to the religious environment in 
Pakistan that intensified the pre-existing Afghan patriarchal society.  Consequently, men 
received most of the food and women were likely to be malnourished and depended on 
charity.33  Therefore UN World Food Program had an unintended unequal distribution.  
UNHCR also encountered resistance of health care towards women.  Depression and 
mental instability in women was common due to experiences lived. They are prone to 
hate towards men and low expectations of the world.  In addition, the limited amount of 
education girls received encouraged more gender inferiority.34  
On the other hand, there has also been a sense of dislike to the Afghan population 
within Pakistani society, which has contributed to disparities in political asylum policies.  
The local shortage of employment often makes Pakistanis argue that Afghan immigrants 
are overtaking the local labor.35  In addition, access to public services or legal 
representation was limited.  For instance in some camps, refugees were required to 
contribute financially to maintain their own schools, water supply and health services.36  
Pressure from local authorities have also played an influential role in the rate of 
repatriation of Afghans.  As quoted from a report from the Reuters foundation, the head 
of the political administration in North Waziristan, (the region along the Pakistani-
Afghan border) Tariq Hayat, stated all Afghans – whether in camps or within all of 
Pakistan would have to leave eventually.37  In addition, by mid-2004, a series of military 
interventions took place in Waziristan by Pakistani forces that were searching for Islamic 
militants, suspected to be Al-Qaeda militants.  The conflict left behind hundreds of 
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casualties.38  This led to the displacement of over 20,000 refugees, where most of them 
returned to Afghanistan.39  Statements and actions like these make Afghans unwelcome 
and harassed, thereby increasing the likelihood of repatriation despite the unsafe 
conditions in Afghanistan.  Unto this pressure, UNHCR has agreed to promote either the 
relocation or the repatriation of refugees from camps along this region. 
In Iran, refugees were not required to settle in camps; they could live where they 
found work, thereby integrating into local society.  They also shared a common language 
(Dari) and religion (Shia Islam).  Like Iranian citizens, they also had access to healthcare, 
basic education and subsidized food.  There were however, restrictions on physical 
movement, since permits were required for travel within the country.  This integration to 
Iranian society has led for a smaller number in repatriation in comparison to Pakistan.40  
(See Figure 2) 
Repatriation from Iran has also been less numerous since refugees were highly 
integrated in Iranian labor and society.  One key factor that has made the number of 
returnees from Pakistan greater has been the weak surveillance along the borders.41  In 
addition, the absence of camps in Iran has caused the refugee population to spread 
thought Iran in search of employment and well-being.  However, due to the increasing 
pressure of governmental policies aimed to restrict further Afghan integration, UNHCR 
has had to increase its repatriation efforts in the country.  Examples of these policies have 
been the increasing restriction for Afghan labor and work permits, reduction of access to 





Over 3.5 million Afghans have voluntarily repatriated since 2001, when an 
apparent political and socio-economic stability was announced.  For a brief time, 
repatriation movements were detained after increasing violence towards humanitarian 
workers in Afghanistan led to the assassination of a UNHCR official.  Repatriation 
resumed when additional security for UNHCR officials was ensured and agreements 
ensuring safety were reached with the government.43  This incident demonstrated high 
levels of violence were still present at the time of repatriation. 
Since the beginning of these repatriation patterns, UNHCR has served as an 
arbitrary assistant and observer for the millions displaced because of war.  Repatriation 
and reintegration in Afghanistan is restricted to massive movement of returnees and this 
implies the rebuilding of one's life and the reformation of a nation.  It has been argued 
this implication is the key reason for the pressure from outside donors.  The “assurance” 
of Afghan reformation justifies US and coalition intervention as “successful”.  As a 
result, encouraging messages of repatriation have been misleading refugees into high 
expectations of the current situation.44  The shortage of housing and the destruction of the 
pre-existing ones have led to the building of over 100,000 temporary shelters that host 
over 500,000 returnees.  Later, in 2004, UNHCR allocated $22 million to finance the 
construction of 20,500 new shelters. 
Rural Afghan areas are prone to higher unemployment rates (thereby poverty) 
than in the cities.  UNHCR has also worked with the central government to make sure 
most areas have a "cash for work" employment program as well as vocational programs 
to help returnees' reintegration in Afghan society.  Although there have been signs of a 
41 
movement for stability, some areas remain uncertain and unaccounted for.  This is an 
obstacle for the remaining refugees at the host countries, mostly Pakistan and Iran, to 
repatriate.  Therefore, further measures for the well being of refugees include 
negotiations with host countries for permanent solutions for refugees who choose not to 
return to Afghanistan.  In the case of future voluntary repatriations, UNHCR encourages 
tri-partite agreements among the host country, Afghanistan and UNHCR.45 
UNHCR’s aim for repatriation implies durable solutions to conflicts in the 
country of origin as well as the reassurance of reintegration.  This of course, depends on 
the conditions on the ground: whether or not there is a degree of political and socio-
economic stability. Therefore, UNHCR’s methods and policies for repatriation depend 
entirely on the nature and pace of such stability.46  In the case that UNHCR deems the 
condition in the ground as suitable for repatriation, it will proceed with the organization 
of return and development programs.  In accordance with its mandate, UNHCR should 
focus on protection and solutions.  In the case of Afghanistan, it focuses and promotes 
agreements between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.  However, the focus on the planning 
itself has often neglected monitoring of the situation of returnees.  By not having a clear 
understanding of the consequences of return UNHCR is restrained from fulfilling its legal 
task for the returnees.47  A common cause for criticism for UNHCR’s involvement has 
been the dire conditions to which refugees return.  According to UNHCR evaluations, 
Afghans who decide to return will do so with or without UNHCR’s help.48  The agency 
therefore serves as a mediator and facilitator for those who decide to repatriate. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, repatriation strategies have recently acquired a 
stratification of approaches to be followed.  In the cases discussed in this work, strategies 
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have been devised for each situation and each population’s needs.  In the case of Afghan 
repatriation from Iran included a tripartite agreement signed in 2002.  UNHCR deals 
directly with the Iranian immigration authority (BAFIA) that accounts for refugees and 
transports them to the border.  UNHCR performs interviews insuring that the repatriation 
is voluntary and supervises transportation of returnees. 
With the case of Afghan refugees in Iran, there are two mainstreams of movement 
for repatriation.  Those who have considerable resources and solid economic standing 
have the means to take this risk.  These often do not go to the UNHCR for help in the 
return process, and often have less problems when rebuilding their lives and acquiring 
sustainable livelihoods.  On the other hand, there is the group with hardly any resources 
who have little to lose by going home.  Members of both groups have already started to 
return and sometimes see themselves returning to Iran.49  Another tendency among 
refugees in Iran has been integration, since many enjoy economic stability and therefore 
do not deem repatriation as a rational choice.  Also, the uncertainty of what to expect in 
Afghanistan provokes a restrained attitude towards return. 
 
Peace-building attempts & their results 
In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement settled for an interim power sharing 
arrangement, the creation of a new constitution, and elections in 2004.  It also set an 
agenda for security, peace process, establishment of peace-building institutions in 
Afghanistan and the watch for human rights.  For example, the Afghan Transitional 
Authority (ATA) in June 2002 provided a framework for a sustained peace-building 
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process in Afghanistan, assisted by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan 
(UNAMA). 
There were limitations to the Bonn Agreement.  For example, it did not include 
agreements with neighboring countries that provided aid to Afghan military factions.  
Therefore, the remnants of Al-Qaida and the Taliban remained supported and active.  
Also, the damage made by the Taliban regime was overwhelming.  The parliament, 
courts, schools and health centers had been destroyed, and land mines are still present in 
random areas.  Infrastructure was virtually non-existent and it would take years to 
rebuild.   Additionally, the establishment of a unified and civilian political culture was 
essential for the elements of the Bonn Agreement to be effective.  Given the previous 
pattern of fragmentation and the lack of a strong central government in Afghanistan, the 
Bonn Agreement proved to be insufficient.  
 When the US-led invasion of Afghanistan began, despite the removal of the 
Taliban regime, a consequence was the empowerment of warlords.  This empowerment 
made the Afghan Transitional Administration’s aim of establishing a civilian government 
nearly impossible as well as the eradication of arms.  With warlords, loyalty is once again 
dedicated to the region; not to the national leaders and institutions.  Therefore, warlords 
now represent the primary threat to peace and stability in the country as well as to Human 
Rights monitoring.  In Kabul, the monitoring of the situation has been easier due to the 
absence of warlord-ruled regions.  Therefore, International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and the heavy international presence has been possible in the capital.  The rural 
areas however, remain under warlord influence.  Here, U.N. officials often have little 
ability to protect persons at risk of human rights abuses. Vulnerable women and 
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minorities, displaced persons and even Afghan government officials have virtually no one 
to turn to when their lives or safety are threatened.50 
  The new constitution grants political rights for women such as equal rights and 
duties under law.  Also ¼ of the seats in the lower house of parliament (the Wolesi Jirga) 
are reserved for women.  At the upper house (Meshrano Jirga), 1/6 is reserved for 
women as well.  In the practice, however, social expectations of the role of women and 
the conservative social nature make it difficult for women to be active in politics.  
  According to reports by Human Rights Watch and The World Today, female aid 
workers, government officials, and journalists face harassment, violent attacks, and death 
threats. Those who challenge the powerful, conservative elements of the country’s 
political structures are targeted because they can be made into chilling examples for other 
women considering political activity.51   
 
Economy in Afghanistan Today 
  With agriculture as the main economic activity, Afghanistan has been adversely 
affected with the constant warfare and drought.  Fields were turned into war zones and 
some remain with landmines today, thereby reducing the possibility of farmland 
development.  Subsistence crops include wheat and other grains, cotton, sugar beets, 
fruits, and nuts.  However, Afghan farmers have resorted to the illegal cultivation of 
opium since it provides a higher pay.  Livestock is also essential in the economy; 
especially sheep due to their wool.  The textile industry relies in the independent 
production of hand-woven carpets. Despite limitations, the flow of foreign aid has 
significantly improved economic development, especially within the agrarian sector.  
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However, Afghanistan’s standards of living remain low, unemployment high and there is 
a lack of basic necessities that will be discussed in a latter section of this chapter.  These 




 According to the World Health organization, Afghanistan's health status is among 
the lowest in the world. In the year 2003 alone, 591,441 died of malaria, while 10,489 
died of tuberculosis. (This accounts for the reported cases only and for the most common 
incestuous diseases)  The population with access to safe drinking water is of a mere 24%.  
In addition to Afghanistan's drought problem, the lack of access to clean water accounts 
for various health hazards.53 
Indicators of coverage with primary health care 
Population with access to safe drinking water (%) 24 1999 
Population with adequate excreta disposal facilities (%) 12 1998 
Pregnant women attended by trained personnel (%) 16 2003 
Deliveries attended by trained personnel (%) 14 2003 
Married women (15-49) using contraceptives (%) 10 2003 
Indicators of coverage with primary health care 
*Source: WHO, 2003 
 
The data for the evaluation of structural violence had to be limited to the data 
gathered in 2004 for the year 2003, since WHO does not have the HALE figures for an 
egalitarian (or worldwide) value for more recent years.  Therefore, for the results to be 
consistent with the same time frame, the value of life expectancy used in the equation 
was for the year 2003.  The average life expectancy for males and females worldwide is 
of 59.3.  Afghanistan accounts for the one of lowest life expectancies in the world (35.5).  
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Afghanistan’s population for 2003 is of 23,897,00.  When applying this data to the 
equation for structural violence, the value V = 270,170.1.  
 
Behavioral (Armed) Violence 
 In a series of Armed conflict datasets, Wallensteen, Peter et al. have coded the 
intensity of conflicts since 1989 in three ordinal variables: (1) Minor conflict; (2) 
Intermediate; (3) Full Scale War:   
Levels of Violence 
Level 1 (Minor)  More than 25 deaths per year 
Level 2 (Intermediate) More than 25 deaths per year & a total history of 1,000 deaths
Level 3 (War) 1,000 or more deaths per year 
Measurements for Behavioral Violence 
Source: Wallensteen et. al. 
 
 In the case of Afghanistan, from 1989 to 2001, violence levels have remained as 
War.  Data for 2002 is missing in the series of studies, yet for 2003, the level of violence 
decreased to a level 2.  Therefore, in 2003 the death toll decreased from more than 1,000 
battle deaths to a toll of 25 to 1,000.  Despite this decrease, there is still a significant level 
of violence that coincides with drought and high health risks and make Afghanistan 
unsuitable for returnees to fully reintegrate, let alone feel safe, in their society. 
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Massive Maya migrations took place as the direct result of the persecution during 
the 36-year long civil war.  Allan Burns offers an extensive study on the Maya refugees 
in his book Maya in Exile.  He states that by 1981 there were over 600,000 refugees 
leaving Guatemala.  Most were either internally displaced within Guatemalan camps for 
them to be watched closely by the army, some sought refuge in Mexican refugee camps, 
while others crossed the border to the US.  Despite their trajectory, they share a common 
purpose; not driven by economic betterment, but by the need of survival and to seek a 
peaceful life were they could enjoy their Maya legacy.  Today, despite their location, 
most Maya refugees are observant of changes in society, but always conscious and proud 
of their heritage (Burns, 1993).  Trends of Maya refugees have shifted in two directions.  
They have either integrated into the society of their host country or they have 
accomplished repatriation and the rebuilding of what used to be their home.  Figures by 
the UN High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) estimate they had sponsored 2,036 
people to return to their home by July of 1999 (UNHCR, 1999).   
In general, According to Allan Burns (1993) and Elizabeth Ferris (1984) the 
North American position on Guatemala has been argued to be one of interference and 
ignorance.  For example, it has supplied weapons and trained the government’s army yet 
it condemns it as a Human Rights violator.  Its intervention in 1954 is by far the most 
evident demonstration of either the lack of knowledge of Guatemalan society or an act of 
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self-interest (Burns, 1993).  On the other hand, Mexico has also had limitations and 
ambiguity in its asylum policies due to its own economic crisis, as Ferris (1984), Kibreab 
(2002) and Labato (2003) suggest. 
Another attempt initiated by Mexican and Guatemalan agencies and the UNHCR, 
has been a repatriation program, which according to Paula Worby (2000) may be 
considered an unprecedented case of international generosity when compared to the 
spending in other return operations.  These new organizational repatriation models might 
serve as important examples for post conflict reconstruction and nation building 
(Janowski, 2002).   
 
Historical Background 
The origins of this conflict go back to the election of President Jacobo Arbenz 
Guzmán, democratically elected in 1944.  Although a former military officer, he 
permitted free expression, legalized unions, encouraged more political parties and 
initiated socio-economic reforms such as land reforms. Lands were redistributed to 
peasant cooperatives, starting by Arbenz’s own land.  His aim for Guatemala was to 
acquire a more balanced economy with a level of independence and for the end of 
caudillismo, or a government fixated on strong leader.  Arbenz publicly declared his 
intentions were to modernize Guatemala through a strong, independent and capitalist 
economy (Immerman, 1981).  
Among other controversial reforms was the Labor code that established minimum 
wage and higher standards for work conditions.  Large employers like United Fruit 
Company saw this as a pro communist reform and as a major threat to this latifundio, or 
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powerful landowners.  The McCarthyism of the cold war era resulted in a “Guilt by 
Association” accusation of Arbenz (Immerman, 1981).  US refused to sell Guatemalan 
government arms, so they had no more option than to buy from the USSR.  This made the 
US believe even more the Communist rumor and consolidated a reason for intervention.  
Richard Immerman also points out that in 1954, the CIA collaborated on the 
overthrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala.  The US trained and 
armed the coup movement that overthrew Arbenz.  The unfortunate result was an 
increasingly militarized government in Guatemala full of corruption. The coup mostly 
meant for Guatemala a “set back” in the economy as well as in the social and political 
facet.  The new military dictatorship was established with Venicio Cerezo on power and 
Guatemala subsequently suffered over 36 years of civil war, where Maya groups suffered 
persecution by the government’s military that alleged they were harboring the Unión 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).  URNG members emerged mostly 
from former followers and supporters of the democratically elected government of 
Arbenz Guzmán.  According to reports from the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico 
(Historical Clarification Commission or CEH), over 200,000 civilians died and 440 Maya 
villages were wiped from the map.  In two years, there were already 100,000 to 150,000 
reported cases of deaths or “disappearances” and Cerezo’s leadership was characterized 
as discriminatory, genocidal and as reluctant to negotiations for peace.54  Also, General 
Rios Montt was quoted in the New York Times of July 18, 1982 as telling an audience of 
indigenous Guatemalans, "If you are with us, we'll feed you; if not, we'll kill you." (2004) 
The CEH released its report based on examination of the causes and origins of the 
internal armed confrontation and on more than 9,000 interviews.  It presents the methods 
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of the violence and its consequences and effects.  The conclusions are then presented and 
are followed by recommendations to the United Nations.  It concluded that the 
Guatemalan Army and its paramilitary groups committed 93% of the human rights 
crimes.  (See Figure 2) Only three percent was attributed to the URNG.  A staggering 
83% of the victims were Maya (See Figure 3).  The commission strongly criticizes the 
Guatemalan government in nature and the North American role in its support.  Like the 
case of Afghanistan, the weakness of the state and its inability to promote consensus 
among its heterogeneous population led to prolonged civil war.55 
Formal negotiations for peace accords were initiated in 1990 and they included 
the demilitarization of society, starting with the UNRG.  They also called for civil 
liberties, empowerment and democratization.  As a result, Guatemala has undergone 
efforts to create awareness of its ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.   These peace 
accords meant the cessation of human rights violations, and the creation of the UN-
funded CEH, which covered all aspects of historical and forensic anthropological 
evidence for the civil war period and presents all evidence to the UN.  It also had the 
authority to oversee reparation initiatives by the government.  With this, there was a 
higher reintegration and monitoring in Guatemala.  CEH’s conclusions revealed nearly 
200,000 victims were killed or disappeared and out of these 93% were Maya Indians.  
They also unraveled 93% of the genocide was performed by the state’s army.    
 
The Refugee Population  
Guatemalans found at the Mexican border are commonly peasants.  Over all about 
100,000 Guatemalan refugees live along the southern borders and were often harassed by 
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military incidents of Guatemalan army searching for URNG members.  Among the 40 
camps the official refugee count by 1986 was of 40,000.  Yet there were an estimated 
60,000 refugees that had not been reported (Ferris, 1984).  Although Maya refugees in 
Mexico have been placed in refugee camps, reports from UNHCR show a great degree of 
social integration in Mexican society.  Examples of this integration include the granting 
of naturalization and land titles to Maya refugees by the Mexican government56.  In 
Campeche and Quintana Roo, all seven refugee settlements were officially recognized as 
Mexican villages, and local municipal authorities were established through elections.  All 
twelve communal credit schemes were systematically registered, which gave members 
full access to other Mexican credit institutions.  In Chiapas, the authorities assumed 
responsibility for all basic health and education services in the refugee settlements.  Some 
support was provided for infrastructure in settlements on undisputed land.  Refugees were 
now able to purchase plots of land as a result of the Government’s decision to allow them 
to settle permanently where they had been living in Chiapas.   
Camps such as El Sexto Sol not only provide the Maya community with a safe 
haven, but also with the opportunity to integrate in the local economy by establishing 
agricultural, weaving and artisan cooperatives that provide a secure market for their 
products57.  As another indication of their integration to Mexican society, Maya refugees 
have greatly contributed to the Mexican cultural heritage and to the agricultural economy.  
For example, they helped restore Maya ruins of Edzna in Campeche and in 1996 
contributed to 12% of the agricultural harvest58. 
Overall, Mexican camps are characterized by maintaining respect for the integrity 
of the community, since refugees are given a basis for self-government.  This was very 
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successful in avoiding bureaucratization of the operations of medical, food and 
educational assistance.  The limited budget of the Mexican Commission for Refugees 
(COMAR) would not have allowed them to have a presence in each of the settlements.  A 
system of self-regulation of food and assistance was allowed, reposing on self-
organization of the Indian communities.   
Mexico has held a tradition of integration and open hands to political 
refugees.  According to accounts by the Organization of American States, in the 
history of Mexico, there have been five cases of asylum being granted on a 
massive scale: 
Date Event Estimated Amount 
of Refugees 





After the exodus caused 





Chilean refugees from 




Refugees from the civil 








Asylum grant patterns in Mexico 
Source: Ortíz Monasterio “Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico: A happy ending.” OAS. 
 
Article 2 of the Mexican constitution that says textually: "Slavery is forbidden in 
the United States of Mexico.   Foreign slaves who enter national territory will 
automatically obtain their freedom and be protected by the laws of the land."  This clause 
extends to Political refugees entering the country, therefore, granting a safe haven for 
Salvadorian and Maya Refugees in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  Therefore, generally 
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speaking, refugees that have chosen to go to Mexico have been well received (Goldberg, 
2001).  However, economic limitations in Mexico call for stricter immigration policies.  
This has caused a somewhat ambiguous procedure towards refugees. 
Local economy in Mexico itself has a serious unemployment issue.  This presents 
a problem when trying to provide aid, security, food and jobs to nearly a quarter of a 
million refugees.  The consequence has been a duality in policies towards refugees.  For 
example, sudden massive deportations occurred on May 20th and July 19th of 1981 based 
on the argument that there was no way of knowing if these immigrants were seeking 
political refugee or economic opportunities.  These circumstances appear to be impulsive 
decisions; they do not reflect the common Mexican policy, according to Elizabeth Ferris 
(1984).  The effect within the Maya population has been negative.  According to Kireab 
(2002) a sense of belonging intrinsic in refugees’ state of mind.  However, they often 
enjoy only a fraction of the benefits of the host state and therefore lack a sense of 
belonging when confronted with ambiguous policies.   
As another result, refugees who have no access to the workforce tend to become 
an economic burden and they not always receive services.  As a consequence, hunger, 
disease and mortality rates are significantly high in their camps.  Another disadvantage of 
Mexico’s refugee situation is the lack of funds for medical attention, as proven by a 
report done for the Forced Migration Review (Alonso et. al., 2001).  The report indicates 
that for women, the situation in refugee camps along the Mexican-Guatemalan border is 
far worse than for males.  They often are vulnerable to theft, harassment and sexual 
abuse.  This is added to that fact that the journey from their homes due to conflict can be 
traumatic.  Maternal mortality among these indigenous groups is the highest in Latin 
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America.  The ratio for maternal mortality among Maya women is 211 per 100,000 live 
births, while for non-indigenous women it is 70 per 100,000 live births.  Contraceptive 
rate is also inferior among the Maya refugees, and the camps have the second highest 
incidence of HIV/AIDS in Central America.  Initiatives to ameliorate the situation have 
been taken by conjunctions with NGO’s (like the Marie Stopes México) and the Mexican 
government.59  The general results have been a higher education of women’s issues 
(among women and men), the decrease of maternal mortality.  The result of the high 
incidence of diseases in camps, also leads to isolation of refugees from the local Mexican 
population, since the Mexican government must take action to control outbreaks within 
its population as well. 
Rodolfo Labato (2003) and Ferris (1984) argue that the open hands policy in the 
case of Mexico has presented ambiguity in policies and this indistinct pattern will 
continue due to internal economic restrains in Mexico.  Unlike Ortíz Monasterio, 
Labato’s work analyses the long-term effect of refugee integration in society.  He predicts 
a possible elaboration of stricter policies due to economic and social constraints.  He also 
states that Mexico’s socio-economic status would have not permitted the integration of 
refugees if the UNHCR had not contributed.  With further analysis of the role of 
UNHCR, Labato points out that although it is a NGO, it must have a strong political 
influence to achieve resolutions such as camp settlements and repatriations.  Therefore, 
depending on the perspective of local Mexicans, UNHCR’s humanitarian intervention 
may be seen as beneficial to Maya refugees, but also as a threat to Mexico’s sovereignty 
and a drain in its economy.   
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On the other hand, the city of Quintana Roo recently issued a total of 322 land 
titles to former Guatemalan refugees who recently became Mexican citizens.  It marks the 
first time the government has donated land for former refugees that have integrated to 
Mexican society.  These recipients were some of the 18,000 Guatemalans who arrived in 
late 1984 and early 1985 after fleeing Guatemala.  Although approximately 43,000 of 
them returned home to rebuild their lives, others chose to remain in Mexico.  
Guatemalans in Quintana Roo and Campeche have become naturalized citizens in a 
process that began in 1996 and ended in August 2001.  This was thanks to the 
government initiative of 1996 known as "Migratory Stabilization Plan for Guatemalan 
Refugees," where close to 23,000 refugees decided stay in Mexico and to integrate 
locally60.  
Another report of the UNHCR by Mariana Echandi (2002), states that a total of 
2,806 property deeds were granted to both naturalized and other Guatemalan refugees.  
For example, Rosalío Alvarado Nojo and his wife María Jorge received the property 
deed, which grants equal rights to men and women. "We're able to work in peace, thank 
God," said Rosalío. "Who would have thought that we would have been given this land?"  
María Jorge later said, "I feel very happy here. And for the rest of my life, I'll feel calm."  
With reforms such as these, Mexican authorities have successfully gained the trust and 
the social integration of Indigenous refugees. 
Two hundred thousand out of 600,000 Maya refugees left to the US.  Most 
refugees find themselves confronted with greater language barriers, and with such a huge 
bureaucracy as the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, formerly known as 
the INS).  This is perhaps one of the major reasons for not all of them to apply for 
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asylum, but to enter illegally.  This causes problems when accounting for how many 
Mayas are present in the US.  According to Burns, between 1983 and 1986 only 14 out of 
1,475 claims were granted.  Statistical reports from USCIS indicate that from 1986 to 
1992 Central Americans filed for nearly half of all asylum applications (USCIS, 56).  
However, the number of individuals granted asylum is reported for Guatemala from 1996 
to 2002 remained significantly low (USCIS, 2002). 
 
Asylum cases filed with USCIS for Asylum – Cases approved, denied or referred 
after interview from April 1991 to September 2002 
Total number of 
cases submitted 
Cases Approved Cases Denied or 
referred 
Percent of Approval 
40,313 3,544 36,771 8.80% 
Source: US Committee for Refugees 2002 Report 
 
According to USCIS reports, a small increment in number of asylum grants is due 
to the class action lawsuit of American Baptist Churches (ABC) v. Thornburg, which is 
mainly extended to Salvadorian and Guatemalan refugees.  For the early 1990’s, the 
settlement halted the deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees and Congress 
allowed the granting of Temporary Protected Status (TPS).  Later, the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (NACARA) was signed into law 
and established new procedures for Nicaraguans, Cubans and some Guatemalans and 
Salvadorians.  NACARA allows certain “former Soviet block” countries to apply for 
suspension of deportation and are granted Lawful Permanent Residency (USCIS, 56).  
The extension of NACARA to Guatemala under the assumption that it is a “former Soviet 
block” reinforces Burn’s argument that US has demonstrated to be ignorant to the 
situation in Guatemala.  I emphasize this because the overthrown government had stood 
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for the capitalization of Guatemalan economy as well as its economic independence.  It 
never asserted to have communist links, nor there was ever any indication other than 
assumptions made by the US’s cold war policies (Immerman, 633). 
According to the UNHCR, there are serious limitations to NACARA applicants 
due to the overload of cases received in the USCIS.  USCIS refers NACARA applicants 
to the Asylum division, which receives general asylum seekers, new arrivals to the US 
that claim to fear returning to their countries and oversees refugees.  Unfortunately, 
NACARA applicants are not the priority.  With the asylum workload growing, only 6,000 
of NACARA cases will be completed each year from now on.  It will therefore take 20 
years for USCIS to adjudicate all the cases (USCIS, 2003). 
Another obstacle that Maya Refugees found when entering the US was the time it 
takes to move from Guatemala to the American border.  Many remained for long periods 
in towns in Mexico before moving on.  This was mainly due to work or simply to 
maintain a low profile, since Guatemalan soldiers at times raided refugee camps in 
Mexico.  This presents trouble for those who seek asylum in the US, since there is a one-
year time limit (from the date the individual last left the country of persecution) to claim 
asylum in the US (USCIS, 2003). 
Despite certain levels of disparity in policies, Maya refugees in the US, according 
to Burns, find convenience in the state of Florida.  The climate somewhat resembles the 
coasts of Guatemala to where most of them had migrated before in search of work, since 
the Guatemalan rain forest was not suitable for farming.  There is abundant work in the 
Florida fields and bearable living conditions.  Despite difficult working conditions, they 
do not complain due to their fear of getting fired or of deportation.  This same reason 
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labels them to most as “migrant workers” and not as refugees that are eager to preserve 
their culture and agricultural traditions.  This was another set back in the legal arena of 
political asylum grants.  According to Burns, US authorities argued that the main reason 
for Guatemalan migrations was economic hardship.  The fact that family members were 
killed “was not enough to prove persecution or to qualify for asylum”.  A new question 
arises.  Why was it so difficult to convince the courts of the existing persecution in 
Guatemala?  Ironically, the fact that they were eager to work presented an obstacle for the 
courts to believe they had been persecuted and face danger if they were to go back.  
However, when presenting a case to the Immigration Court, it all comes down to 
evidence.  Personal statements and accounts do not constitute enough evidence of being a 
victim of ethnic persecution.  Maya refugees often have no land titles to prove they were 
forced from their homes, police reports of violent incidents in their community, or any 
form of “hard evidence” to prove their asylum statements. 
The major Maya community in the US is located at Indiantown, Florida.  Living 
conditions are relatively better if compared to the Maya at Mexico.  However, there is 
still a significant crime rate.  Unfortunately, Maya agricultural workers are main targets 
of robberies since they rarely use banks and keep their wages at their homes or carry 
them.   
 
Repatriation 
The first attempt for repatriation took place in 1986 as an initiative of the 
Guatemalan government and monitored by the army.  This attempt had relatively small 
success and returnees were set in camps that were constantly watched by the army.  
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Unfortunately, the result of this first attempt was a militarized establishment that 
suppressed popular movements and opposition.   
With a second attempt, the refugees at Mexico and the Guatemalan government 
negotiated a second wave of repatriation that would be negotiated with the Guatemalan 
state and a unified movement of refugees in Mexico.  This came to be known as 
Comisiones Permanentes and had a significant degree of success according to accounts of 
refugees themselves.  This collective return was not yet funded or aided by UNHCR.  Its 
terms were defined by refugees and agreed to be followed by the government.  These 
terms included the access to land and credit for returnees to re-establish their agrarian 
way of life and to ensure their sustainability. 
UNHCR interfered with the mass returns that began in 1993 in Ixcan-Quiché.  
This time, returnees were accompanied with UNHCR officials, members of NGO’s and 
Governmental institutions.  With the case of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP’s), they 
organized the Comunidades de Población en Resistencia (Communities of Population in 
Resistance, CPR) and despite working and organizing themselves in hiding, they 
negotiated and paved the way for Maya resettlement and reparations.  With such a high 
solidarity and organization of refugees, the negotiation achieved higher results than most 
repatriation and reintegration programs.61 For instance, the achievement of land 
resettlements, educational reforms and economic integration of IDP’s and returnees has 
been a direct result of organized mass mobilization.  On the other hand, those who 
remained in hiding and had no direct participation in the Maya political activism received 
no assistance.  Their high activism also caused for the Maya to become a political voting 
force that was able to define local elections.  In fact, in one of their general elections, a 
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prominent leader of the CPR was elected Mayor.  Peace accords have also been promoted 
and the Maya have become advocates for peace and reconciliation processes.  They have 
also taken an active role in education, health and the economy with the knowledge and 
experience they have acquired in exile.62 
The role of women in Maya activism has been key to the reinvention of Maya 
way of life.  Within Maya culture, women’s role is strongly linked to the future and 
survival of culture.  As the carriers of children and their role as educators and 
homemakers, women have remained as the representatives of Maya tradition.  For 
instance, the use of traje, the Maya traditional dress today is often limited to women.  
Men rarely dress in traditional clothing today.  Weaving tradition among women has also 
created a cultural revitalization with the commercial marketing of Maya textiles.  
Political activism has also been inclusive towards women.  Once resettled into their 
communities, women often united to create awareness of the need of women political, 
social and economic participation.  In some communities however, women’s activism has 
been repressed.63 
Even though Guatemala has gone a long way in reintegrating returnees, there are 
still limitations to the full access to equality for the Maya.  Distrust and the fear of 
discrimination acts remain, since there has been a conversion of the Guerrilla movement 
into a political party.  Furthermore, when expectations of return were not met, there was a 
slight tendency of withdrawal from the political space.  Expectations for the full 
reintegration of returnees have had limitations, mostly due to economic restraints.  Due to 
the agrarian nature of Maya way of life, most communities still depend on subsistence 
farming and outside aid.  With the remote location of most of the Maya communities, the 
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access to other sources of employment and at times education is often limited.  In 
addition, infrastructure and services (such as roads, justice, and health) are not always 
accessible to these communities.  Hence, despite achievements of a degree of integration, 
the full integration and equality of returnees is yet on its way.64 
Until today, this has been a program that according to Paula Worby may be 
considered as an unprecedented case of international generosity when looking at the 
spending in other return operations (See Figure 7).  She argues that in the context of the 
1980’s cold war approach to Central American politics, many international donors were 
interested in counteracting U.S. policy in the region seen as prolonging armed conflict 
and social confrontation.   
Returnees that had been in exile and internally displaced now play an essential 
role in being active participants in education, health and cultural programs, influenced by 
their experience outside of their homes.  Despite pre-existing differences among the 
groups and dominant power structures, Maya repatriates have remained faithful to their 
communities and to the revitalization of their culture.  However, limitations still make 
their resettlement an uphill battle.  Most of these communities rely completely on 
subsistence farming and on outside aid to live on.  Their communities lack the 
infrastructure, state services – such as justice, education and health – and proper trading 
and commercial routes.  In addition, Guatemala remains as one of the countries with the 
most unequal distribution of land, where 2% of landowners control 72% of Guatemalan 
land.  The responsibility of further developments lies on the state, but economic 
limitations make it difficult to achieve progress.  However, there is a consensus within 
the international community and neighboring countries that the Guatemalan government 
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must officially recognize and repair moral and material damage caused to the Maya 
during the war.  The returning of land to refugees and to the internally displaced has its 
limitations as well.  Most of them have no proof of previous ownership and the 
Guatemalan government has no sufficient resources to provide most methods of 
repatriation.  The CONTIERRA, (or the Legal Assistance and Resolution of Land 
Conflicts) has a mandate to resolve land conflicts, yet it is often limited by the slow and 
ineffective activity of the government’s land title agency.  Another problem that land 
repatriation has is how most internally displaced and refugees fear being persecuted if 
they reclaim their lands.  Therefore, it is very unlikely for the restoration of property in 
the hands of the government to have a significant success. 
Upon return, the lack of lands for the continuance of the traditional Mayan 
agrarian culture has been unlikely.  As a consequence, many Maya peasants have had to 
move within Guatemala according to employment opportunities as seasonal laborers, 




The data for the evaluation of structural violence had to be limited to the data 
gathered in 2004 for the year 2003, since WHO does not have the HALE figures for an 
egalitarian (or worldwide) value for more recent years.  Therefore, for the results to be 
consistent with the same time frame, the value of life expectancy used in the equation 
was for the year 2003.  The average life expectancy for males and females worldwide is 
of 59.3.   Population in Guatemala by 2002 was 12,347,000, while life expectancy is 
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57.4.  Hence, the value for structural violence is 6,892.05.  According to the WHO, 
outbreaks in Guatemala have not been a significant threat to the healthy life expectancy.  
In addition, immunization programs initiated by the state and the total state expenditure 
for 2003 was of 47.5% of its GDP. 
 
Behavioral Violence 
 Observations from the CEH determined violence could have been stratified into 
four periods.   The first, from 1962 to 1970 targeted mainly the rural population, 
professors and students.  From 1971 to 1977, community leaders, labor unions and 
students were the main target.  The most violent stage was from 1978 to 1985, where the 
indigenous population was targeted entirely and Maya villages were wiped out.  The last 
period (1986 to 1996) targeted all sectors of society. 
 Despite peace accords and NGO efforts to create awareness, tolerance and peace, 
the fear of persecution is still present in Guatemala, since former forces are still present in 
Guatemala.  For instance, former president Rios Montt has not been prosecuted yet and is 
currently the president of the Guatemalan Congress.  According to Armed conflict 
datasets by Peter Wallensteen et al. the magnitude of conflict in Guatemala reached level 
3 in 1992, a year before UNHCR intervened in mass repatriation movements.  The 
database does not account for violence before 1989.  However, the Center For Systemic 
Peace categorizes conflict in Guatemala from 1964 to 1966 as “Sporadic Political 
Violence”65.  From 1966 to 1996, violence is categorized as  “Substantial prolonged 
Warfare”66 After 1996, conflict subsided to less than 25 deaths per year.  Hence, unlike 
Afghanistan, repatriation in Guatemala is more likely due to the significant improvement 
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in peace negotiation and stability.  In addition, the high levels of activism of former 
victims have indicated the opening of political space for returnees.   
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CHAPTER V  
Conclusion 
 
In Afghanistan, isolation in refugee camps, lack of employment and income, 
made the refugee population cross the borders constantly in search of temporary labor.  
This makes it extremely difficult to truly quantify and monitor refugees and their well-
being.  Despite UNHCR’s efforts to improve repatriation and the proper quality of life for 
reintegration, Afghanistan proved to be such a large venture that it made these efforts 
ineffective due to the lack of funding and resources to sustain such a large population.  In 
addition, the case of Afghanistan’s encashment program proved to be an attempt to 
“deregister” refugees in Pakistan, rather than aid for repatriation and monitoring of the 
situation.  Pressure by Pakistan to close refugee camps and to remove all Afghans from 
Pakistan makes Afghans unwelcome and harassed, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
repatriation despite the unsafe conditions in Afghanistan. Hence, a manner of 
intimidation to refugees has been taking place.  Once deregistered, refugees left camps 
for clandestine societies where they had little or no access to health facilities, education, 
food or employment.  Hence, the encashment program presented negative repercussions 
for returnees and refugees remaining in Pakistan.  In addition, false expectations of the 
amount of aid to be “poured” into the rebuilding of Afghanistan caused large 
repatriations, even when the conditions were not suitable for such a large return. With the 
destruction of homes, there was not enough shelter for the vast amount of returnees that 
needed assistance.  As a response, UNHCR employed the building of additional shelters 
through the “cash-for-work” program, which provided employment for returnees.   
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Arguments from policy analysis state the encashment program was less costly 
than other programs.  However, the “recycler” problem proved the program lacked proper 
organization and monitoring of refugees.  It also demonstrated the weak surveillance 
along the borders.  Local infrastructure was virtually non-existent, it would take years to 
rebuild and the promised funds arrived lat or did not arrive at all.  Donors were mainly 
interested in the mere survival of returnees, not on state re-building. 
 Another threat to security was Afghanistan’s ongoing drought and the aftermath 
of 23 years of war left the agricultural sector in ruins and the rural population was 
consequently unable to make a living once they returned.  This has created an ongoing 
dilemma in the classification of who is a refugee and who is an economic migrant. 
 When evaluating structural violence and taking into consideration previous 
quantification of behavioral violence, the environment in Afghanistan looks unsuitable 
for return and for reintegration into the socio economic arena. Lack of security due to 
high behavioral violence has been among the main threats to reintegration of returnees. 
The level of incidents has not reduced significantly and violence outbursts are still 
common, thereby lowering safety.  Warlord regime reinforced by North American tactics 
to liquidate the Taliban will continue being an obstacle for the unification of the Afghan 
state and for proper stability.  According to reports by Human Rights Watch and The 
World Today, female aid workers, government officials, and journalists face harassment, 
violent attacks, and death threats.  In terms of structural violence, facilities, shelter and 
infrastructure are the main barriers for the insurance of safety. (Not to mention that 10% 
of the country is filled with land mines)  
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Despite the recognition of lack of security and the intensification of hostility 
towards electoral, governmental and humanitarian workers in Afghanistan, the plans for 
repatriation are still on their way and have been encouraged with monetary 
compensation.  Hence, the pre-conditions established in UNHCR’s mandate have not 
been met at the time of implementing repatriation.  This had several implications 
including the disregard for the mandate, returnee safety and the proper reintegration, 
since there has been no emphasis on establishing stability.  However, the disregard of 
stability prior to repatriation does not fall entirely on UNHCR activities.  As mentioned 
earlier in this and in previous chapters, the interest of donors and of host countries seem 
to have a direct impact on how UNHCR decides to employ its strategies.  In the case of 
Afghanistan it may be concluded that pressure to relief Pakistan of the responsibility of 
caring for refugees and donor’s interest in legitimizing outside intervention in the country 
have been key factors in this case. 
The case of Guatemala proved to have a more efficient strategy and as a result, a 
different outcome.  Guatemala had started its efforts to mend relations before UNHCR’s 
intervention and initiated the return of victims.  This initial attempt was strongly 
criticized since it was initiated and controlled by the army with the intention of 
establishing Indian societies that were controlled and overlooked by the government.  
With gradual international intervention this intention was overturned.   
As with the case of Guatemala, violence was not entirely subdued and the 
political environment for the time of repatriation was deemed unsuitable according to 
Human Rights Watch.  The difference with Guatemala was the type and degree of 
intervention from UNHCR and NGO’s.  For instance, the escorting of returnees to the 
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specific location of repatriation, and community training programs.  Another factor 
present in Guatemalan repatriation was the direct participation and negotiation of 
returnees often through the Comisiones Permanentes.  In addition, the establishment of 
the UN-sponsored Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH) ensured the 
investigation of events and underlying reasons for violence in Guatemala with the goal of 
creating national and international awareness of the necessity of conflict resolution in 
Guatemala.  It also urged international intervention and called for the unification of 
victims and overall, their reintegration to society.  These attempts for unification and 
mobilization were successful, since there was high solidarity and organization of 
refugees.  As a result negotiations achieved higher results than most repatriation and 
reintegration programs.  For instance, the achievement of land resettlements, educational 
reforms and economic integration of IDP’s and returnees has been a direct result of 
organized mass mobilization.  On the other hand, those who remained in hiding and had 
no direct participation in the Maya political activism received limited assistance.  
Therefore, mobilization and political participation of returnees presented a benefit for 
individuals as well as the mending of social and ethnic conflicts.  The CEH covered all 
aspects of historical and forensic anthropological evidence for the civil war period and 
presents all evidence to the UN.  It also had the authority to oversee reparation initiatives 
by the government.  With this, there was a higher reintegration and monitoring in 
Guatemala.  Structural violence in Guatemala was significantly lower than Afghanistan 
yet had a positive value of 6,892.05.  Unlike Afghanistan, WHO reported no outstanding 
outbreaks and immunization programs initiated by the state and the total state expenditure 
for 2003 was of 47.5% of its GDP. 
69 
Once examining all these aspects of each case, overall the quantification of 
structural violence, demonstrated the difference in Health-Adjusted Life Expectancy in 
the two cases was quite different.  Structural violence in Afghanistan was significantly 
higher than in Guatemala.  Behavioral violence at the time of repatriation was also at high 
levels according to also the quantification of conflicts by the Center for systemic Peace 
and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute.  Nonetheless, conflict in Guatemala was 
more controlled than the ongoing insurrection in Afghanistan.  Hence, the likelihood for 
full reintegration of returnees to their society was higher in Guatemala than in 
Afghanistan. 
 With the strategy employed, it was clear the encashment program employed in 
Afghanistan was not suitable due to the deficiency of proper monitoring of safety and 
movement.   Guatemala on the other hand proved to be a concrete and comprehensive 





















Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan 
Asylum 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Pakistan 1053000 1200000 1200000 1200000 1200000 1200000 2000000 2197821 1226569 1123647 
Iran 1623331 1429038 1414659 1411759 1400722 1325724 1482000 482000 1104909 834699 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52289 46975 
Netherlands 2,050 3644 7830 12003 15958 20256 23629 26024 26001 26433 
UK 110 820 1260 1915 3450 4645 5675 15065 20305 21718 
Other 52658 45631 50487 50997 46985 51066 76032 88857 80221 82571 
Total 2,731,149 2,679,133 2,674,236 2,676,674 2,667,115 2,601,691 3,587,336 2,809,767 2,510,294 2,136,043 




































Voluntary Contributions to Repatriation 
Source: UNHCR Global Report 1999 
FIGURE 6 
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